The hot topic of discussion on our e-mail platform in recent days has been the bewildering events in Moldova after the recent disputed parliamentary elections there. Comrade V., a member of the Rezistenţa Populară group in Chişinău, kindly agreed to answer some of our questions.

1. What are the concrete contradictions between the pro-Voronin and opposition bourgeois groups?

The main contradictions between these groups center on personal commercial interests. There are no essential ideological or socioeconomic contradictions between them; or rather, these differences are purely ornamental. If we compare their political platforms, then we’ll see that all their promises—to raise wages to European levels; to increase pensions and stipends to the minimum living standard or higher—are completely populist because none of the parties explains where they plan to get the money.

In essence, what we’re seeing now is a struggle for spheres of influence in the commercial structures and for political power. This time round, Voronin decided not to stand on ceremony—to push the opposition into the background and not take them into account in any way. The ruling oligarchy decided to resort to falsifying the results (there are such cases), but the only thing it didn’t take into account was the possibility of popular demonstrations.

Obviously, power is being consolidated in the hands of the bourgeoisie, which is what always accompanies a consolidation of capital and the means of production.

2. Why has the idea of unification with Romania come up now? Or is this constantly in the background of Moldovan politics?

The theme of unification with Romania and the issue of what the language should be called [i.e. Romanian vs. Moldovan] are the usual bogeymen that are pulled out of the closet when the electorate needs to be taken in hand. (That is, this is done so that the electorate understands whom to support, including during the elections. In the end, this plays into the hands of the PCRM.) Yes, there is a minority of the populace—mostly, the remnants of the intelligentsia—who still rave about reunification, but the mass of the population prefers to live in an independent country, especially now that the crisis is sweeping the world. Our country might be a swamp, but it’s a warm, familiar swamp. But young people really have nowhere to turn. Maybe they would like to find well-paid work here, but under the current capitalist regime they aren’t given this opportunity. That is why they’re often inclined to support anyone whomsoever as long as at least something changes.

3. How much basis is there to Voronin’s claims that the Romanian secret services were involved [in organizing the unrest]?

During his entire administration, Voronin has been doing his best to strengthen his own system of state security. The creation, equipping and maintenance of the Information and Security Service (SIS) and the Supreme Security Council have probably put a big dent in the budget. You could spot SIS agents at every demo that happened in Chişinău. But now it turns out that they slept through an attack by foreign secret agents! Well, if that’s the case (since this is what Voronin says), then the SIS isn’t worth a farthing. So now they should be punished to the full extent of the law for their incompetence.

4. How strong was people’s interest in the elections themselves?

If you believe the statistics, 59.5% of the electorate voted in these elections. That is, people didn’t ignore the elections, but this percentage is lower than for the previous elections in 2005 (64.84%) and 2001 (67.52%). Many people say that elections have gradually turned into a farce or (at best) a festival. The majority is equally irritated by the red-orange hydra of Voronin and Roşca (Christian Democratic People’s Party), and the yellow-green-blue “cuttlefish” of Urechean (Alliance Our Moldova)-Filat (Liberal Democratic Party)-Chirtoacă (Liberal Party). People have bigger fish to fry. For example, how to live on a pension of 600 lei, to pay for utilities when the monthly heating bill alone comes to 900 lei. Or how to live on a monthly wage of 2,000 lei (and sometimes much less)—that is, how to clothe and feed your children, pay for kindergarten, school, university fees, medical care, and those very same crazy utilities bills. As they try every way they can to eliminate the class contradictions from their policies, the bourgeois parties are forced by other means to curry favor with the voters. This includes playing the “anticommunism” and “reunification with Romania” cards or promising entry into the EU—they really just have nothing else to offer people. But it’s unlikely that they will fulfill even these promises because opening the borders with the EU would lead to an even greater exodus of the population, who won’t be willing to work here for kopecks.

5. Considering the fact that the unrest didn’t begin immediately after the elections, is the opposition’s behavior directly linked to the election results?

The opposition began stirring things up before the elections in fact. It tried to stoke passions as much as possible. You have to hand it to them: in this they were successful. I think that if the communists had avoided falsifying the results, the opposition would have got what it considered it was in its rights to ask for—that it be taken into account. Then it would have immediately set about divvying up the portfolios and seats in parliament with the PCRM. But the PCRM ran such a smooth operation and spent so much money (officially, they spent around 5.5 million lei on the campaign—more than any other party) that they ended up outwitting themselves as well. Instead of a triumphal procession in celebration of their third administration, they got an organized popular revolt. Although it wasn’t carried to its logical conclusion, it showed that the PCRM, which to this point has done its all to support business, has no support amongst the masses.

6. All political forces claim that they had nothing to do with the demonstrations. What really mobilized people?

I think that the mobilizing factor was the hopeless situation of a particular social group (I wouldn’t begin to divide it according to language)—young people, who were counting on certain changes in the social, educational, and economic spheres, and who long ago lost confidence in Voronin personally and in the grouping of capitalists he has consolidated around himself. One thing is clear: in the absence of coherent social and political demands by the opposition, this social group will gradually radicalize. At present, around two hundred of the people who participated in the riots have been detained by the police. They’re facing fifteen years in prison for taking part in a coup—that is how Voronin has labeled the popular revolt against his regime. We’ll soon find out whether the leaders of the opposition will be arrested or whether our vigilant SIS will “slip up” again and let them escape into neighboring Romania. Whatever happens, the appearance in our country of political prisoners will do little to strengthen the Voronin regime and the country’s “stability.”

7. What is the role of the imperial powers in the current situation? Does the US want to bring down the Voronin regime? Is the EU interested in bringing Moldova into its fold? What are Russia’s interests?

As for international imperialism, I myself said on live TV that the Voronin regime has been supported in particular by the US ambassador in Moldova. Suffice it to say that the “red-orange” compact between CPSU apparatchik and ex-interior minister Voronin and pro-Romanian nationalist Iurie Roşca was concluded in the safety of the US embassy.

(This compact was reached after the 2005 elections when Voronin didn’t have the necessary number of votes in the parliament for re-election. This is precisely why, in the present elections, the voters “rolled” the Christian Democratic People’s Party. Roşca himself didn’t gain the minimum 6% required for re-election and thus lost his seat in the new parliament.

“Practically speaking, close and active collaboration between the CDPP and the PCRM (although it was hidden from the public eye) began earlier. (For example, during the government crisis in late 2000/early 2001, when the PCRM parliamentary faction teamed up with the CDPP faction and tried to oust the government of President Peter Lucinschi on several occasions.) But the birth of a genuine “red-orange,” purely pro-American regime in the form it exists today happened after parliamentary elections in March 2005.”)

During the entire period of its administration, the Voronin regime has closely cooperated with the World Bank and the IMF, in particular with the SCERS program, which provides loans for economic development and poverty reduction. But what the World Bank and the IMF essentially demand is liberalization of the economy and privatization of the principal state sector enterprises.

By virtue of their interests, Russia, the EU, and the US would rather that Voronin stay in power. To be more specific, Russia doesn’t want another Georgia here. The EU is already conducting its own set of reforms: it is introducing its own system of education per the Bologna Process, including fees-based tuition and contract teaching, as well as its own system of medical insurance. (From my own experience, I can say that people are not very enthusiastic about these reforms.) The US is pushing its banking and loans system. Romania has extended its citizenship rights to the Moldovan population. (Until recently, people could get Romanian passports at the Romanian embassy. Voronin legalized dual citizenship, and so several of our parliamentarians have Romanian citizenship.)

How would the US profit by “whacking” the Voronin regime? Voronin more or less suits both the US and Russia. Russia is afraid of Romania, the EU, and NATO expanding onto Moldovan territory. As long as Russia keeps Transnistria as its ace in the hole in its dealings with Voronin, he’ll have to take Russia’s opinion into account. If the opposition comes to power, they might give up Transnistria and then Russia would just have to lump it. (It is clear that Transnistria is huge problem for the Moldovan political elite, a problem it isn’t capable of solving. That is why the opposition also seriously considers the option of joining Romania even without this region. As for who to give it to, one famous liberal politician declared that Russia could have a concession on it for thirty years!)

As for the US, I’ve already said that it was the US that encouraged Roşca to accept Voronin’s offer of an alliance. That means that Voronin suited the US then and he continues to suit them now: he does everything the World Bank and the IMF tell him to do. The overthrow of the Voronin regime would strengthen Romania’s position here; the US would probably have to step aside if Moldova joined the EU.

But no one in the EU is in hurry to take in Moldova. It’s the poorest country in Eastern Europe, but on the other hand it’s quite eager to please. Even without membership of the EU, it is conducting all the liberal reforms—reforms in education per the Bologna Process; reforms of its medical provision system; economic reforms via privatization. That is, it’s doing everything to become a capitalist country. (The communist symbols mean nothing.) But if the opposition comes to power and, let’s say, holds a referendum and it suddenly passes (which I seriously doubt), or Romania suddenly decides to open its borders and let us in, to rig up some kind of union with Moldova, then in this case the Moldovan leadership would lose its independence. It would no longer be possible to apply simple stupid pressure on it and blackmail it with loans and credits. You would have to go through Romania and the EU, and that’s not quite the same thing as direct pressure.

So all this spy mania isn’t worth a damn thing. Actual geopolitical interests don’t warrant such insinuations.

8. Western media have made a lot of the role of the “Twitter” generation in organizing the protests, citing in particular the work of liberal journalist Natalia Morar and her Think Moldova group. One US website even went so far as to claim that since young Moldovans can’t reasonably afford the iPhones (or other mobile devices) and high-speed Internet access necessary to carry out such complex actions, then this technology might have been supplied to them by US-front organizations. What is your reaction to such claims?

Maybe Morar was even able to organize some kind of flash mob consisting of six people. What, there weren’t flash mobs here before then?

Those students aren’t actually all that poor. At very least, having a decked-out mobile phone is considered the norm in their circles. It’s a matter of prestige, as they say.

9. The western media have also made much of the fact that, apparently, this is a confrontation between “liberals” in the opposition and the ruling “communists.” Are the communists really communists? What’s up with their name?

The communists emerged as an opposition to the liberal democratic forces that took power after 1993. As one of our comrades noted, this was something like the Zyuganov phenomenon in Russia. But when they themselves came to power, they rejected social and political change, and Voronin declared that there was no alternative to capitalist development in Moldova.

After this, the PCRM started to lose its activists and supporters. At present, there are no convinced, principled activists in its ranks (that is, no one who isn’t a paid-off party hack). Several of the members in our group (Rezistenţa Populară) left the PCRM after they came to power.

But, as you understand, they kept the name for cover.

A Communiqué from the Rezistenţa Populară Political Movement on the Situation in Moldova after the Parliamentary Elections of April 5, 2009

According to the official results of the parliamentary elections that took place on April 5, 2009, the ruling party in Moldova, the pseudo-communist PСRM (Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova), received 49.9% of the vote. This enables them to seat 61 deputies in parliament, and their votes are sufficient to elect the republic’s new president (who requires a three-fifths majority of deputies to take office). Despite the fact that international observers have declared the elections fair, numerous violations were noted on election day. Voters were surprised to find on the voting rolls the names of their dead relatives, as well as the names of unknown people who had been mysteriously registered as living in their apartments. There were also cases when election commissions refused to give people ballots—because someone had already signed and voted for them.

The opposition parties publicly disputed the falsified election results. On Monday evening they held a peaceful protest rally on the square next to Government House that brought out approximately five thousand people. On April 7, from twenty to thirty thousand people gathered in the center of the capital; these were mainly university and high school students, who came in response to appeals from the opposition parties. Their principal demand was that the results of the election, which they believed had been falsified, be overturned, and new elections be held. Opposition leaders very quickly lost control of the crowd. The authorities, who had not anticipated such massive protests, had posted insufficient numbers of policemen to guard the buildings of the parliament and the presidential administration; they were simply swept away by the enraged crowd. The police—who in 2008 “heroically” dispersed protests by pensioners unhappy with their miserly pensions (lower than the minimum living standard)—proved powerless against the young people. Despite attempts by representatives of the opposition parties to prevent acts of vandalism, their appeals were simply ignored. The rioters smashed all the windows on the first two floors of Parliament and the Presidential Palace. Both these buildings were looted; furniture and documents were torched. Two stories of the Parliament were completely gutted by fire, and two police vans were burned. The damage amounts to millions of lei. The main propaganda force in these protests were members of the nationalist parties. It was they who chanted “Down with the communists!” and raised the flags of Romania and the EU over the Parliament.

In his address to the nation, President Voronin characterized these events as a coup, and he laid all the blame for the events on the leaders of the Liberal Party, the Liberal Democratic Party, and Our Moldova Alliance. That same day, PСRM representative Marian Lupu met with the leaders of these parties. In a neutral albeit admonitory tone, he asked them to cease all protests and engage in dialogue within the bounds prescribed by law. The opposition leaders repeated their demands for new elections, and they blamed the authorities and the police for what had happened. According to the opposition leaders, it was their actions that had provoked the riots.

In light of the current situation, Rezistenţa Populară makes the following statement. We fully recognize the fact that the ruling party falsified the election results. It is losing support amongst the masses, and it has attempted to compensate for this lack of support through falsification in order to remain in power. (For the bourgeois grouping who backs the party, this is quite important.) However, the PСRM’s influence is still quite great, and a significant number of voters did in fact vote for this party insofar as the other parties represent the interests of even more odious bourgeois groupings. Unfortunately, seduced by the PСRM’s promises to preserve an illusory “stability,” voters from the masses of workers and the poor did not use their chance to vote for the working-class candidate from Rezistenţa Populară. The central plank of our platform was organization of the workers’ struggle for their rights.

The events in Chişinău are a reflection of the struggle amongst the main groupings of the bourgeoisie over the redistribution of property and state power. The PСRM is supported by the state bureaucracy, which is wavering in this situation (the party has had no principled activists in its ranks for a long time). The opposition is supported by young people (mainly Moldovan speakers) unhappy with the system. The campaign platforms of these parties are indistinguishable. Both the PСRM and the opposition support rapidly integrating with the EU and continuing the liberalization of the economy. However, a defeat for the PСRM would destroy the party, which over the course of the past eight years has discredited the idea of communism. The young people who chant “Down with the communists” quite sincerely believe that communism equals the Voronin regime. His clan owns the factories, banks, transportation, IT, and telecommunications companies, and it is under his regime that a police state has been established in Moldova. President Voronin is Moldova’s chief “communist,” but his son is one of the republic’s biggest capitalists, a billionaire. And yet our country is the poorest state in Europe.

Rezistenţa Populară condemns the acts of vandalism, which have caused enormous damage to public property. However, we believe that blame for this is shared both the leaders of the opposition, who failed to keep the protests peaceful, and the authorities, who were unable to provide the necessary security for the parliament and presidential administration buildings. It is likely the case that, not entirely sure whether police units were loyal to him, Voronin was simply afraid to give orders to take more decisive action, just as was the case twenty years ago, when he was the interior minister of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic.

We believe that the protests also have a definite social subtext. Most young people feel abandoned and unwanted by society in the new period of “stability” that has been established by the regime. During an “interview” with journalists from PRO-TV in the looted parliament building, one of the young marauders said, “I’m twenty now. What will I have in this country by the time I’m thirty? Nothing!” In essence, the universities are diploma mills for gastarbeiters, who will replace their parents on construction sites in Moscow and Italy.

In the current situation, Rezistenţa Populară’s main task is to provide a class-based explanation for what is happening. We argue that there is no principal difference between the PСRM and the opposition; that we need to fight not for one bourgeois against another, but in order to get rid of them all. It is capitalism that is to blame for everything: it throws people into the trash heap; it deprives them of work and the means of existence or turns them into beasts of burden. The only solution is for workers to unite in the struggle for their class interests—for a decent wage, pension or stipend; for an end to the privatization of public property; for the nationalization of the principal means of production and the banking system. In the end, for socialism!

April 8, 2009

Originally published (in Russian) on the website of the Vpered Socialist Movement.

Rezistenţa Populară (Moldova)

Rezistenţa Populară/Народное сопротивление (People’s Resistance; henceforth, RP) is a Marxist political movement that conducts popular protest actions and works to help the working class achieve self-identity and unity. The RP is convinced that the world of private entrepreneurs, thieving speculators, private banks, chronic unemployment, and armies of poor people—a world where the rich gradually grow richer while absolutely all other strata of the populace grow poor—is unjust and should be destroyed. It should be replaced by a world of social guarantees, a world without private ownership of the means of production and the exploitation of men by other men; a world where all the mean of production will belong to the whole society and will be used for its benefit, not merely for the enrichment of the minority constituted by the powers that be and the major private capitalists and owners.

In our struggle with capital we are creating a revolutionary working-class party. We take our ideas to the masses by appealing directly to work collectives and all those citizens who do not wish to merely look on as they are constantly robbed and repressed by the current ruling clique. In its actions, the RP exposes the thieving essence of the neoliberal reforms now being carried out in Moldova by the ruling party. As strange as it may seem, this party is the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM). However, the goal of the RP is not the gradual but pitiful improvement of workers’ lives or the constant struggle against discrete manifestations of developed capitalism’s negative tendencies, but the complete removal of the capitalist system as the underlying cause of all these phenomena.

The RP was organized by former members and supporters of the PCRM who opposed the party’s total rejection of its own program and its declaration of a new policy in favor of the further entrenchment of capitalism in our country. This was preceded by a number of events, including, for example, the collapse of the Communist Youth League of Moldova (UTCM). The straw that broke this camel’s back was the trial of Yevgeny Nikolaev, a leftist activist from Moldova who was arrested at the AntiCap conference in Moscow in 2002. The leadership of the PCRM and UTCM made no attempt to gain their comrade’s freedom. Several groups emerged from the collapse of the UTCM—Communist Alternative, NBP-Moldova, and New Komsomol—while other activists simply left the movement. Thus, the Chişinău organization of the UTCM was left with only a few careerists to do the bidding of the PCRM. In late 2003, leftist activists agreed a series of joint actions and dubbed this campaign the People’s Resistance. The core of the RP is young people (under thirty-five). Among the RP’s participants are workers, clerical workers, students, teachers, and pensioners.

The RP’s theoretical platform is Marxist-Leninist. The RP is open to collaboration with all anti-capitalist leftists engaged in real struggle. For example, we cooperate with the RRP (the Trotskyist Revolutionary Workers Party), the PCM-CPSU, and the NGO Salvgardare. In addition, the RP attempts to recruit other self-declared leftist organizations into active struggle with the capitalist system. The RP’s actions have included demonstrations, pickets, propaganda and education (mass leaflet campaigns at major social events and in connection with particularly important issues), protest petition campaigns, organizing house committees, the fight against in-fill construction, and work with factory and enterprise collectives before and during strikes.

Since 2002, the PCRM has pursued a policy of neoliberal reforms. Immediately after his electoral victory, President Vladimir Voronin assured the business elite that he would not overturn the results of privatization. In 2003, the government announced that it intended to pursue integration with the European Union and continue the privatization of state enterprises and remaining state properties. Moldova sent a military contingent to assist US forces in Iraq. (The entire PCRM parliamentary faction—71 deputies—unanimously voted for this decision.) In late 2003, the RP (which originally was formed as the organizing committee for the action “The People’s Resistance”) planned a series of demonstrations against the authorities’ planned major offensive against the interests of workers (rate increases for such vital services as telephone, gas, etc; the introduction of insurance-based medicine). These actions took place in February and May 2004, and were partly successful. (For example, the government gave up its plans to raise rates for local telephone service although the decree to this effect had already been published). In 2004, the police state tightened the screws: RRP activists were accused of calling for the overthrow of the regime, while two National Bolsheviks were charged with criminal offenses after throwing packets of kefir at the OSCE representative in Moldova and several ambassadors from NATO countries.

2005 was a parliamentary election year. The police state continued its crackdowns against the opposition, while the PCRM pursued further its cooperation with NATO and GUAM. An RP member participated in the elections as an independent candidate. The influence of the PCRM amongst the masses fell: voter turnout in Chişinău was slightly over fifty percent. Nevertheless, the party won a majority in parliament (56 seats), which, however, was not enough to re-elect the president. Under pressure from the US, the leaders of two seemingly opposed parties, the HDNP (extreme right-wing nationalists from the former Popular Front of Moldova) and the PCRM formed a so-called red-orange coalition. After a few more deputies from other parties were bought off, Voronin managed to gain the number of votes necessary for his re-election.

The PCRM used compromising material to force Chişinău Mayor Serafim Ureceanu to resign his post. Vasile Ursu, a member of the PCRM, was named the interim mayor, and the city council was taken over by coalition similar to that in parliament. Because of the PCRM’s total control of the city council, it became nearly impossible to obtain authorization to conduct social and political protest actions in the city: the authorities began to wholly ignore and simply suppress civic discontent. Indicative in this regard was the precedent set by the way the authorities dealt with the residents of a building whose electricity had been turned off.

In 2006, the government began reforms of the housing and utilities sector. (A demonstration of citizens outraged by these reforms was banned the authorities.) The PCRM consented to a joint training exercise with NATO troops (Longbow/Lancer-2006) on Moldovan territory despite the fact that the country’s neutrality is enshrined in the constitution. The RP conducted a massive leaflet campaign against these exercises. However, the authorities disrupted attempts to hold an anti-NATO demonstration. It was even impossible to hold an anti-NATO conference: the authorities threatened the owners of the conference hall rented by organizers and sent police to the conference site. In response, the RP launched a petition campaign calling for prosecution of those officials who had violated Moldova’s constitutional neutrality.

In 2007, the government announced a policy of total economic liberalization. The RP carried out an action in defense of the Cuban Five and against the establishment of a police state in Moldova. The RP likewise called for a boycott of the fourth round in the mayoral elections and carried out a massive leaflet campaign demanding that the system of municipal elections be changed to include the possibility of recalling all municipal council members. In response to a popular boycott of the first three rounds of the mayoral elections, the PCRM reduced the legally required minimal turnout from 33 percent to 25 percent. In the fourth round, which produced an extremely low turnout of voters, the PCRM’s candidate, Veaceslav Iordan, suffered a stunning defeat. The PCRM passed a law on the privatization of public property and put more than 260 state-owned enterprises on the auction block. The RP once again carried out a massive leaflet campaign against privatization. As a result, the PCRM for the first time gave up its “ritual” demonstration on November 7 (October Revolution Day), and the authorities were forced to denounce the text of our leaflet on national radio.

In March 2008, we carried out an action of solidarity with imprisoned Romanian miners. The latest round of privatization is taking place as we speak. The targets of privatization include enterprises that are vital to Moldova, on the one hand, and “tasty morsels” for foreign investors, on the other. Already on the auction block are Carmez, Farmaco, Vibropribor, Orhei-Vit, UNIC, Moldtelecom, and Banca de Economii (the former state savings bank). Air Moldova (the state airline), Hotel CODRU (the national hotel), and the cafeteria in the parliament building are being readied for privatization. At present, the RP is gathering petitions from Chişinău residents who oppose the privatization Moldtelecom, Banca de Economii, and other companies. We are conducting this campaign in each of the city’s districts. Whatever residential building we go into, we take our petition to each apartment, and in this way we find out what people think about the privatization of the state sector (which is in essence public property). The RP is attempting to explain the present situation directly to rank-and-file citizens, to find out their opinions, and to send the signed anti-privatization letters to the parliament, the government, and the president of the Republic of Moldova. The reaction of people to our appeal varies from incomprehension to passionate support. However, the RP believes that it will be able to radically alter the situation and convince people that only active, unified resistance to the neoliberal regime can improve the material condition of all citizens, not merely a handful of foreign investors and the clan of party bigwigs. For the national economy should and must be made to work for the welfare of all Moldovans without exception.

—Vadim Lungul, with assistance from Gheorghi Codreanu (RP)

Вадим Лунгул / Vadim Lungul
Россия нуждается в миграционной политике / Russia Needs an Immigration Policy

Положение дел таково.
Рабочий класс практически уничтожен внутри страны
или рассеян по ближнему и дальнему зарубежью.
Как таковой класс интеллигенции
также практически уничтожен.
Вместо них народился новый класс – торгующий всем,
но с другой стороны
класс который ничем не владеет.
Это класс, состоящий из нанятых продавцов на рынке
до менеджеров в крупных магазинах и диллерских контор.

The situation is like this:
The country’s working class has practically been destroyed
Or dispersed throughout the near and far abroad.
The intelligentsia as a class
Has also practically been destroyed.
In their place a new class has been born: traders of everything.
On the other hand, however,
This class owns nothing itself.
This class consists of hired sellers in the markets
And managers in department stores and dealerships.

Произошла деполитизация классов.
В лучшем случае все выглядит примерно так:
Работник пусть работает, -
продавать будет не он.
Художник пусть работает, -
но продавать будет не он.
Продавать будут продавцы.
У работника есть менеджер.
У художника есть галлерист,
У писателя есть издатель.
И т. д..

A depoliticization of the classes has taken place.
At best, it looks something like this:
Let the worker work:
It won’t be him who does the selling
Let the artist work:
It won’t be him who does the selling.
The sellers will do the selling.
The worker has a manager.
The artist has a gallerist.
The writer has a publisher.
Et cetera.

Те, кто производит реальное,
отодвигаются на задний план,
автор реального скрывается,
на передний план выплывает товар,
за товаром стоит лицо продавца и упаковщика.
Тот, кто из реального делает товар, -
тот и получает львиную долю.

The folks who produce the real
Are pushed into the background.
The author of the real is hidden.
The commodity emerges into the foreground.
It is the seller’s and packer’s face we see behind the commodity.
It is the men who turn the real into a commodity
Who receive the lion’s share.

Они это объясняют так:
мы даем вам возможность зароботать деньги,
хоть и не большие, но сами посудите,
если бы не мы, вы бы вообще ничего
не смогли бы заработать,
а так как мы умеем правильно подать то,
что вы производите, то и прибыль
в основном должна идти нам.
Они делают деньги, используя данную
социально-экономическую ситуацию
по максимуму. Рынок диктует свои условия,
а они – удачливые игроки на рынке.

This is how they explain it:
We give you the chance to earn money.
Although the money isn’t good,
You wouldn’t earn a penny otherwise.
But since we know the right way to offer up
What you produce, the profits
Should mainly be ours.

Все остальные же получают по мелочи,
дальше по цепочке, тому кто
произвел реальное достаются крохи.
Иллюзионисты – производители иллюзорного товара,
это артисты рыночных отношений,
других артистов самому рынку и не надо.
Артисты и художники сами по себе
могут существовать, но только как
приятное развлечение
после всех дел.

Everyone else gets a pocketful of small change,
And so on down the food chain.
The folks who make the real get crumbs.
The illusionist—producers of the illusionary commodity—
Are the real performers in the theater of market relations.
The market itself has no need of other actors.
Actors and artists can exist
In their own right, but only as
A pleasant distraction
After all the real dealing is done.

Есть еще сравнительно малочисленный класс владельцев,
владеющих производством,
которые покупают на рынке труд и время,
необходимые для процесса производства товара и услуг.
Эти тяжеловесы – всегда нуждаются в иллюзионистах.
Самое главное для них – чтобы их собственность
осталась в их руках. Таким образом, рука руку моет.
Иллюзионист и собственник правят,
остальные – надрываются и подыхают.

There is also a comparatively small class of owners
Who possess the means of production.
On the market they purchase the time and labor
Needed to produce goods and services.
These heavyweights always have need of illusionists.
What’s important to them is that their property
Remain in their hands. Thus, one hand washes the other.
The illusionist and property owner rule,
While everyone else strains and struggles and kicks the bucket.

Государство – совмещает в себе черты класса иллюзионистов
и класса владельцев.
Сейчас уже не принято говорить народное достояние,
собственность народа, а принято говорить -
государственная собственность.
То есть средневековье на новом уровне.
Феодалы и государство как главный феодал.

The state incorporates the traits of the illusionist class
And the class of owners.
Nowadays it’s no longer kosher to speak of the people’s property.
We now speak of state property.
That is, the Middle Ages have returned on a new level.
The feudal lords are back, with the state as the overlord.

А посему вот что с мигрантами вырисовывается.
Рынку не важно кто вкалывает, для него не важно
где вкалывают. Для рынка вообще работник
не является работником, он для рынка -
лишь вечный спутник процесса, вечный его раб.

And hence this is what happens with migrants:
The market could care less who does the heavy lifting.
It could care less where that lifting happens.
From the market’s point of view, the worker
Isn’t a worker; from the market’s point of view he
Is always a mere satellite of the process, forever its slave.

А так как государство – точно такой же феодал
на рынке как и частный собственник (только крупный
и более ловкий), то и для него граждане – это
бесконечный процесс пополнения его бюджета.
Государство делает все, чтобы укреплять и укрупнять
свой бизнесс. Государство может заботиться о рождаемости,
но опять же в этом ключе расширения своего бизнеса.

And since the state is the same sort of feudal lord
On the market as the private owner (only bigger
And more cunning), from its point of view citizens
Are the means to the endless process of padding its budget.
The state does everything it does to secure and enlarge
Its business. The state can tinker with the birthrate,
But again this is done only to expand its business.

На самом деле нами правят законы рынка,
а государственные законы, которые ему противоречат -
не соблюдаются или соблюдаются с нарушениями.
А лучше всего будет государству – совсем без законов.
Когда останутся только законы неписанные – то бишь
законы рынка. И на этих законах строится новая мораль
и новая жизнь.

In fact, we are ruled by the laws of the market.
Laws of the state that contradict these laws
Are not enforced or are observed in the breach.
The best thing for the state would to be free of laws.
Then all that remained would be the unwritten laws;
That is, the laws of the market. It is on these laws
That the new morality and the new life are built.

Мигранты сейчас вне закона.
С ними государство может
обращаться как ему вздумается.
И это обращение порой бывает
много хуже чем с преступниками,
так как с преступником оно должно
обращаться в рамках закона.
Потому государство в тайне приветствует миграцию,
особенно нелегальную.
Потому что мигранты – это идеальные “граждане”
капиталистического государства.
“Граждане”, которые подспудно отказались от закона
и согласны играть в игры с государством
по правилам рынка.
Вместо того, чтобы устраивать акции протеста
и добиваться лучшей доли у себя на родине
(иногда это дело сложное – согласен, но не безнадежное),
они ведут эту опасную игру с капиталистическим шулером,
у которого пытаются отыграться.

Immigrants are now outside the law.
The state can dispense with them
As it wishes.
And sometimes it treats them
Much worse than criminals,
Because it has to treat criminals
In accordance with the laws.
And so the state secretly welcomes immigration,
Especially illegal immigration.
Because immigrants are the ideal “citizens”
Of the capitalist state.
These are “citizens” who have implicitly refused the law’s protection
And agreed to play the state’s game,
With the rules laid down by the market.
Instead of organizing demonstrations
And fighting for a better lot in their homelands
(A complicated thing, for sure, but not hopeless),
They play this dangerous game with the capitalist con man
And try to beat him at his own game.

Защитить мигрантов можно, если заставить государство
принять закон о миграции, так чтобы мигрант
оказался в юридическом поле, а не просто в поле.
Мигранта должен защитить прежде всего закон.
Такой закон, чтобы
мигрант не боялся государства.
Допустим, закон по которому,
мигрант, получивший работу,
считается уже гражданином
а не нежеланным гостем,
со всеми вытекающими последствиями.
Ну например, сроком на год.
Если у гражданина нет никаких
проблем с правопорядком и законностью,
то через год он получает право на гражданство,
скажем, уже в течение 5 лет, и т. д..
А вот гражданин, убивший другого гражданина,
карается лишением гражданства.

We can defend immigrants by forcing the state
To pass a law on immigration, so that the immigrant
Finds himself in the field of the law, not simply out in the field.
It is the law that should protect the immigrant first and foremost.
The law should be such
That the immigrant doesn’t fear the state.
For example, the law should be such
That when the immigrant gets work
He is automatically considered a citizen,
Not an unwanted guest,
With all the ensuing consequences.
For example, he would be given a one-year trial period.
If the citizen has no run-ins with the law,
Then after a year he gets the right to apply for citizenship,
Say, after another five years, etc.
But the citizen who has murdered another citizen
Will be punished by the revocation of his citizenship.